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Between 1955 and 1960, thousands of workers opened up “the dark jungle” of the mid-
dle Zambesi Valley on the border between today’s Zambia and Zimbabwe to “provide 
light and power for a nation”.1 The Kariba hydroelectric dam, built to turn the recently 
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established Central African Federation into an industrial power, was a microcosm of 
late-colonial, state-making modernisation.2 To Kariba’s supporters, the dam and its mas-
sive reservoir constituted “a lasting impression of great Federal beginnings and a great 
future promise for our country”.3 From today’s perspective, however, the super-ambi-
tious project rather seems to confirm historians’ judgements of the Federation as a “quite 
extraordinary mistake”4 as well as general critiques of modernisation as a hubristic effort 
preserving existing material and power asymmetries.5 Not only was the expensive project 
narrowly targeted at the rapidly growing industrial sector in the region, mainly the mul-
tinational copper business, it also entailed the forced eviction of 57.000 Gwembe Tonga, 
who were shifted away from the rising waters in a “poorly conceived, and trauma-ridden, 
crash program”.6 
Local actors did not fail to see these imbalances and tried to redress them, as the follow-
ing pages will show by employing the example of two prominent Northern Rhodesian 
Africans – Hezekiah Habanyama, the most influential member of Gwembe Valley’s ‘tra-
ditional’ administrative council, and Harry Nkumbula, leader of the Northern Rhode-
sian African National Congress (NRANC).7 The ‘loyal administrator’ and the ‘nation-
alist resister’ perceived each other as antagonists. However, as this paper argues, their 
positions with respect to Kariba actually had much in common as both leaders struggled 
with, rather than against, development.8 Their perspectives therefore help to illustrate the 
fundamental ambivalence of nation-building modernisation. 
1. Planning Kariba
Kariba’s asymmetries were the outcome of a controversial planning process, initiated 
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authorities and the project’s main financier, the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD). The hydroelectricity scheme was the most central develop-
ment investment of the Federation which was established in 1953 against fierce African 
opposition and broke apart only ten years later. This uneasy union between three very 
different territories – the British protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland as 
opposed to self-governing Southern Rhodesia with its strong settler community – was 
declared by its political fathers as a ‘middle way’ between black and white independ-
ence movements and was hoped to become a showcase of communal development in 
a ‘multiracial’ state.9 Industrialisation and economic expansion seemed like unpolitical 
panaceas for reconciling the black discriminated majority with the privileged settler mi-
nority. If the Federation’s present economic growth was sustained, IBRD experts argued 
in their Kariba appraisal report, “then there should continue to be a margin for granting 
improvements to the Africans without cutting the European standard of living”.10 
At the same time, late-colonialism’s initial development enthusiasm following the Sec-
ond World War had already suffered a range of serious blows at that stage11 and also Ka-
riba’s planners were aware of the risks involved in over-optimistic public spending. After 
a dramatic increase of cost estimates in early 1956, IBRD experts became even more 
nervous about the debt burden on the Federation’s economy.12 British authorities also 
realised that Kariba would consume a major part of the Federation’s financial and labour 
resources at the expense of general development in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
which was effectively African development.13 Moreover, the Northern Rhodesian Gov-
ernor predicted serious hardships, even casualties, resulting from the forced evictions of 
the Gwembe Tonga, the people who were living in the region.14
Despite the new state’s professed dedication to ‘racial reconciliation’, the lopsided project 
was finally given green light. Fearing nationalist settlers’ hostility as well as a power 
shortage in the copper industry, British authorities were anxious to see the Federation 
“get off to a good start”.15 Moreover, economy-centred and universalistic concepts of 
modernisation which were gaining international ground at the time as well as the young 
state’s new policy of ‘multiracial partnership’ provided a language to legitimise Kariba as 
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rifices to kick-start a broader development process.16 British Treasury officials identified 
the Federation’s white business elite as the ‘senior partners’, predestined to spearhead the 
self-induced “industrial revolution” which would translate automatically into “the ad-
vancement of the native”.17 Similarly, IBRD experts argued that an expanding industrial 
sector was the best means to “hasten the transition of the Africans to a money economy 
and a Western-type society”.18 Also the Federal Prime Minister justified Kariba postu-
lating that “[i]t is vital that we have this cheap power so that we can industrialise and 
employ our rapidly increasing African population”.19 As a consequence, an international 
development agency committed to helping colonised peoples supported a regime which 
was dreaded by the indigenous majority. Despite their different motivations, Federal 
politicians, IBRD experts, and British officials thus agreed on a specific ‘pecking order’ 
of modernisation in which big business was prioritised while Africans had to wait for the 
expected trickle-down effects. 
2.   Contestations from within – Hezekiah Habanyama and  
the Kariba resettlement20
Hezekiah Habanyama, however, was not prepared to wait. The chief councillor of the 
Gwembe Tonga Native Authority (GTNA), the administrative body of chiefs and coun-
cillors supposedly representing the ‘traditional’ leaders of Gwembe Valley, had been col-
laborating with the colonial government for several years to improve the standard of 
living in the area.21 These previous efforts, ranging from agricultural measures to an 
extension of primary schooling, were rendered obsolete when local ‘advancement’ had 
to be sacrificed for Kariba’s national ‘progress’. Moreover, Habanyama’s own position 
among the population came under pressure. Being largely responsible for the resettle-
ment, he and the other Native Authority members feared the hostility of their people 
as well as a revival of nationalist-inspired resistance, which had troubled them consider-
ably earlier in the decade. At the same time, their crucial role in this difficult situation 
enhanced their status in front of the British officers.22 Especially Habanyama, thanks to 
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his outstanding education, had made himself an indispensable mainstay of local admin-
istration.23 During the years of resettlement, the chief councillor used these conflicting 
pressures strategically, bargaining with the government to get the best terms possible 
for the people. His position as a self-conscious mediator, as will be argued, defies such 
dichotomous categorisations as coloniser / colonised, collaboration / resistance.24
The news of the Kariba resettlement in April 1955 came as a shock to the Native Au-
thority. Members feared that the decision reflected the growing influence of the Fed-
eral Government, which they did not trust to be “particularly concerned with African 
problems”.25 Realising that they had no choice but to accept the decision, however, they 
quickly adopted a pragmatic attitude and drew up a list of concessions in return for their 
cooperation. These so-called “24 Points”, which were eventually signed by the Northern 
Rhodesian Governor, would become an important point of reference throughout the 
resettlement and its aftermath.26 Apart from securing some minimal conditions for the 
removal, the “24 Points” laid down that the Tonga, once the reservoir filled up, must be 
allowed to shift back to the shore to make use of the fertile drawdown area and to install 
fisheries. These concessions were crucial in retrospect, giving the Northern Rhodesian 
Gwembe Tonga a significant advantage over their southern counterparts, who were per-
manently barred from the lakeshore and its economic potential.27 
During the resettlement and the ‘rehabilitation’ phase, Habanyama assumed the role of 
a watchdog: He toured the valley, talked to the people and persistently pointed to the 
numerous shortcomings, reminding officers of their paramount responsibility towards 
the population.28 Moreover, he used his insider position to make known people’s griev-
ances. In his reports, which were passed on to the Governor and to the Colonial Secre-
tary in London, he graphically described the Gwembe Tonga’s “feeling of hopelessness 
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Most strikingly perhaps, the Native Authority later managed to prevent the formation of 
a joint company between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and the Federal Gov-
ernment that was meant to regulate business activities centred on the future Kariba Lake. 
Here, the chiefs and councillors asserted themselves against their superiors in the north-
ern administration who would rather cooperate with than be outdone by the Southern 
Rhodesians.30 In order to ensure that the Tonga profited as much as possible from this 
new asset, the Native Authority insisted that they would not allow “foreign powers” to 
have a say over their part of the lake.31
The Native Authority’s considerable impact on the move and its aftermath was the result 
of shifting micro-politics of consent and protest. Habanyama was determined to retain 
the solidarity of the British officers who he regarded as allies against land-grabbing set-
tlers on the one hand and nationalist ‘troublemakers’ on the other. Similarly, he was 
courted by the officers, who realised the “difficulty of securing the services … of people 
of Mr. Habanyama’s calibre”.32 Constantly declaring his willingness to cooperate and 
his loyalty towards British colonial rule, Habanyama was able to express, in his words, 
“constructive criticism” and exchange “frank and heated arguments”.33 His position thus 
exemplifies how colonial mimicry was not only a tool of domination but also a menace 
as middlemen like Habanyama, who were actively encouraged to ‘mimic’ the rulers by 
adopting their language, cultural habits and education, threatened to blur the central 
distinction between colonisers and colonised. The councillor displayed considerable skill 
in using his ambivalent position strategically, navigating between being “almost the same 
but not quite”, ostensibly living up to his superiors’ expectations while also finding ways 
to assert himself.34 Prepared to operate within the framework of British rule, whose 
salaried servant he was, Habanyama, however, also drew claims from his impeccable 
record of colonial role performance: “The Northern Rhodesia Government has a duty to 
develop us. It has an obligation to spend money on our benefit.”35
On the one hand, this strategy was pragmatic. Even if he “did not appreciate the benefits” 
of the scheme itself, Habanyama realised that Kariba could not be stopped and instead 
tried to negotiate its ‘side effects’ to the Tonga’s benefit, seizing the opportunities arising 
from the fact that Gwembe now received governmental assistance to an unprecedented 
degree.36 The once neglected Tonga “have gained a lot”, he found once the resettlement 
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schools, were taught to fish, advised on improved agricultural techniques and found 
employment with various contractors in the area.37 On the other hand, Habanyama’s 
strategies also need to be seen in connection with a hard and fast struggle over local influ-
ence. Fearing an erosion of their own authority, the chiefs and councillors had banned 
the Northern Rhodesian African Congress in Gwembe in 1953 and showed a firm hand 
in dealing with offenders.38 ‘Loyal administrator’ Habanyama cast himself as the exact 
opposite to the “homeless, frustrated and failures in life [who] take the leading part in 
what would be called nationalist politics”.39 As an ‘authentic’ son of Gwembe Valley 
– well-versed in local drum music and dances, married to a Tonga wife, and shunning 
the cosmopolitan life that would have been open to a man of his qualification – he laid 
claims to know the “real grievances of the masses” better than “any outsider”.40 In gov-
ernment reports and in his own writings Habanyama was portrayed as an ideal broker of 
controlled change, sufficiently ‘Westernised’ to spearhead local ‘advancement’, neverthe-
less firmly rooted in the ‘traditions’ of the valley.41
Habanyama not only knew his place in the scripts of indirect rule, he also accepted the 
development schedule of a slow ‘transfer of power’ – postponing political change until 
socio-economic improvements had paved the way for it.42 His commitment to gradual-
ism came under increasing pressure, however, when Gwembe ceased to be a “hidden spot 
on the map of the world”.43 He perceived his community to stand at a turning point of 
their history as the advent of modernity not only promised prosperity but also posed a 
threat of chaos. The chief councillor worried about the “terrible confusion” caused by 
technical development:44 Gwembe was swarmed by experts, who sometimes went “out of 
their way to try their University theories, forgetting the human element in their method 
of approach”.45 The Tonga, forced to swap the natural resource of the Zambesi River for 
wells, boreholes and pumps, had to get used to a “mechanical world”.46 Different people 
– engineers, workers, businessmen – were “coming into Gwembe from many parts of 
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are getting excellent which will mean easy travelling and easy transport. Cash economy 
is gaining its way at a terrific speed.”47 All this might result in a corruption of morals 
and a loss of cultural ‘identity’, Habanyama warned. In order to not let the rapid social 
changes “get out of hand”, he strove to negotiate his own vision of development, which 
had nothing to do with electricity, industrialisation or universal economic rules, but was 
about schools, boreholes, medical facilities, agriculture and fishing.48
3.   Nationalist critiques – Harry Nkumbula and the  
Northern Rhodesian African National Congress (NRANC)
In official and public discourse, African nationalism embodied the very opposite of de-
velopment: ‘Constructive administrators’ struggled against ‘destructive politicians’, who 
stirred up “personal hatred” at a time when “harmony is most essential”.49 After the 
nationalist movement had suffered a serious blow in 1953 as the organised African resis-
tance under the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress (NRANC) party had 
not been able to prevent the formation of the Federation,50 Kariba was feared to become 
a new “spear-head of the Congress attack”.51 The few available scholarly assessments 
also suggest that NRANC leader Nkumbula opposed Kariba, treating his ‘anti-dam cam-
paign’ as a successful case of nationalist mobilisation at the grassroots.52 However, Harry 
Nkumbula neither combated development, nor did he attempt “to wreck the Kariba 
Gorge scheme”.53 Rather, as will be argued here, his position vis-à-vis Kariba was highly 
ambivalent, bespeaking the difficulty of ‘resisting’ a big-scale infrastructure project that 
promised to bring ‘light and power for a nation’.
A few months after the Federal Prime Minister had announced the Kariba decision in 
March 1955, the Congress president petitioned Queen Elizabeth II on behalf of the 
Gwembe Tonga.54 In this central document, however, Nkumbula neither questioned 
47	 GTNA	Annual	Report	956,	by	Habanyama,	NAZ	SP	4/2/8.
48	 Ibid.;	see	also:	GTNA	Annual	Report,	959,	by	Habanyama,	NAZ	SP	4/2/5.
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the rationale behind the power project – improving living standards through planned 
industrialisation – nor categorically rejected the idea that the resettlement might be a 
justifiable measure for the sake of progress. Nkumbula’s challenge to Kariba’s modernisa-
tion lay in the realm of representation, ownership, and participation, aimed at including 
the Gwembe Tonga, or Africans generally, in the development process. Concretely, the 
petition asked that it be “determined whether it is just that the people should be dispos-
sessed of their land” and whether the removal was for their “benefit”. If no less harmful 
alternatives, for instance a nuclear power scheme, were found, the Tonga had to be ad-
equately compensated. Moreover, a commission of “a majority of Africans” and of inde-
pendent “hydro-electrical engineers” should be appointed “to examine and to determine 
the points already raised”. Finally, the future power plant should not be in the hands of 
the Federal settler government, but be administered by a Northern Rhodesia-controlled 
corporation.55 
Nkumbula followed this line of approach – principally accepting high-tech modernisa-
tion but demanding African participation in it – throughout his ensuing Kariba-cam-
paign directed at the colonial government in London. Here, the politician joined forces 
with a network of colonial-critical organisations, like the Anti-Slavery Society and the 
Fabian Colonial Bureau, as well as individuals, including famous writer Doris Lessing. 
Most of them he already knew from his time as student at the London School of Eco-
nomics (LSE) in the late 1940s.56 Now, during the heyday of international anti-colo-
nialism, Nkumbula and his allies used Kariba to ensure that the ‘periphery’ spoke back 
to the metropolis. By disclosing harrowing local information, Nkumbula enabled his 
supporters to formulate a knowledgeable critique.57 Through members of the Labour 
opposition party their protest reached the British parliament where a series of embarrass-
ing questions exposed the Colonial Secretary’s ignorance and powerlessness regarding the 
Gwembe situation.58 Moreover, the lobbyists challenged dominant discourse on Kariba 
in a range of publications, condemning the resettlement on humanitarian grounds and 
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ics made concrete demands on behalf of the Gwembe Tonga – for technical assistance, 
compensation, rights to the lakeshore and participation in the reservoir’s economic de-
velopment – while also taking their fate as an example of Britain’s failure to protect 
colonial subjects against the discriminating politics of Rhodesia’s settlers.
In later years, however, the well-coordinated alliance crumbled, mainly because of 
Nkumbula’s increasing isolation, both nationally and internationally, following the fall-
out with his rival Kenneth Kaunda and the split of the nationalist movement in 1958.60 
Moreover, Nkumbula’s stance on Kariba, so stable and coherent in his metropolitan 
campaign, seemed significantly more nebulous from a local perspective. While Brit-
ish authorities had repeatedly been told that the Congress demanded fair treatment for 
the Tonga, but “does not condemn the Kariba scheme as a whole”61 and agreed “that 
these removals are necessary”,62 most people in Gwembe were under the impression 
that Nkumbula was fighting against Kariba.63 This misapprehension certainly owed to 
the fact that communication with the Gwembe Tonga was severely restricted due to the 
Congress ban. At the same time, Nkumbula’s messages to them may have been deliber-
ately obscure, especially since the people clearly entertained the forlorn hope that their 
political idol would prevent the removal.64 Thus, the NRANC president was celebrated 
for his metropolitan intervention,65 but remained vague with respect to the exact aims of 
the campaign. Regarding his petition, the impression created in party publicity and the 
local press was that the Queen had been asked to stop the move altogether.66 Similarly, 
Nkumbula gave out ambivalent directives to the Tonga. In a circular letter, for instance, 
he claimed that the evictions had not yet been officially sanctioned and went on: 
So you can take it for granted that until and when the Secretary of State agrees to your 
moval [sic] you should resist any attempt to move you. But if and when they move you, 
you must ask for adequate land which is just as large and equal in value as the land you 
are being moved from. And you should ask for compensation …67
When a group of people stubbornly resisted the move, leading to an open riot with eight 
fatalities in September 1958, colonial authorities were quick to blame the Congress lead-
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had been instigated by Nkumbula and his fellow “evil men”, who had “told lies” to the 
“backward people”.68 However, Nkumbula and Kaunda strongly refuted this allegation. 
Later investigations also concluded that local organisers themselves had used the name 
of the party “to reinforce their authority” without having been authorised by the head-
quarters.69 At the same time, the NRANC’s ambiguousness may well have stimulated the 
spreading of certain rumours prior to the incident, which officers held accountable for 
people’s growing rebelliousness – for instance that the dam would break, that Nkumbula 
would stop the project and that he did not want the people to move.70 
Becoming a projection surface for the Tonga’s hopes was instrumental in Nkumbula’s 
endeavour to present himself as their spokesman and consolidate an important local 
support base at a time when his leadership in the nationalist movement came under 
attack. The Tonga’s frustration boosted Nkumbula’s popularity in the valley and also 
helped to fill the party’s coffers.71 How deeply his resettlement campaign was enmeshed 
in a struggle over authority emerges from numerous documents in which Nkumbula 
protested against the way Congress activity was repressed in the valley – an issue which 
often loomed larger than the more immediate concerns of the evacuations.72 Moreover, 
he did not tire of branding the Native Authority as stooges of government, who had ir-
responsibly given their consent to the removal with reckless disregard for the people. The 
politician thus seriously misjudged the nature of the Native Authority’s ‘consent’ and 
failed to see their efforts on behalf of the Gwembe Tonga.73 Also Habanyama, in turn, 
did not appreciate how remarkably similar his own strategy was to the position adopted 
by the Congress, who he perceived to be “opposing” the resettlement “on principle”.74 
Therefore, possible synergies were, knowingly or unwittingly, sacrificed for the personal 
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4. Politics and development 
While both men thus shared a concern for the Tonga’s participation in Kariba’s benefits, 
their underlying visions of modernisation appeared much less similar. In contrast to 
Habanyama’s commitment to gradualism and ‘un-political’ advancement, Nkumbula’s 
notion of development was closely intertwined with bolder visions of independent na-
tion-building. Although the relevant literature and sources are rather patchy, it can be 
safely maintained that Nkumbula embraced the idea of development and talked about it 
in a way which was remarkably similar to contemporary technocratic paradigms.75 Con-
tradicting government’s accusations, Congress claimed to be committed to the “promo-
tion of the educational, political, economic, and social advancement of the Africans”.76 
Moreover, as Giacomo Macola has recently shown, Nkumbula shared the views of many 
educated Africans, who regarded socio-economic development as the cornerstone of self-
governed nation-building, and “subscribed to the … basic evolutionary scheme – from 
tribe to nation”.77 Nkumbula’s suggestions about how to overcome ‘underdevelopment’ 
bespeak his LSE-background and aligned him with prominent modernisation theorists 
of the time.78 He advocated, for instance, state-planned “economic activity” for the sake 
of “market expansion” and pleaded for infrastructural improvements as well as an intel-
ligent exploitation of natural resources with the help of scientific experts.79 Even a large-
scale hydroelectricity scheme had a place in the nationalists’ plans for Central Africa’s 
modernisation, as Nkumbula had argued already in 1953:
Africans would have worked out a scheme for economic development in Central Africa. 
The Central African Council80… could have been looked into and see whether it could 
have been given executive powers to effect major economic schemes such as the proposed 
Hydro-electrical Scheme at the Kariba Gorge. Such a plan would have been met with the 
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And yet, this statement also exemplifies how Nkumbula’s position differed from the 
strategy Kariba’s planners pursued: Economic development could not be independent 
from political reform since “there is no economic stability without political stability”.82 
In collaborating with leftwing Fabian-Labour circles during his metropolitan Kariba-
campaign, Nkumbula furthermore allied himself with the ‘ultra-modern’ fathers of 
the “second colonial occupation”, who had initiated the greatly increased effort to de-
velop the colonies after the Second World War.83 Technological state-run development 
schemes featured in leftist grand visions too. However, Kariba’s critics were not prepared 
to believe in automatic ‘trickle-down’ effects and demanded instead that the government 
make modernisation more inclusive. Within the current (settler-)colonial framework, 
they argued, the drastic changes were prone to produce further discrimination.84 Fur-
thermore, the Africans, having suffered from “the humiliations of the colour bar” all their 
lives, were not prepared to put off their legitimate demands for political participation 
and democratic rule for very much longer.85
During the later stages of the project also Hezekiah Habanyama appears to have come 
to regard the “political kingdom” as a necessary prerequisite for Africans to rise from 
poverty.86 After a series of broken promises and drawbacks in the resettlement process, 
shattered hopes and increasing frustration turned the Native Authority into a target of 
people’s hostility. The ‘loyal administrator’ thus started to question his course of mod-
eration.87 In 1960 Habanyama served on the Monckton Commission, which had been 
set up to investigate into public attitudes towards the Federation and the state’s future 
prospects.88 Touring the three Central African territories to collect evidence, Habanyama 
connected his own disillusioning experiences in Gwembe with the rising tensions at the 
broader level at a time when the ‘multiracial experiment’ seemed on the verge of failure.89 
Disagreeing with the critical but not entirely condemnatory verdict of the Commission, 


















the	 Nyasaland	 Emergency	 in	 March	 959.	This	 period	 of	 violent	 unrest	 and	 harsh	 governmental	 repression	
“marked	a	 turning	point	 for	 the	Federation”	 (P.	Murphy,	 Introduction	 [footnote	9],	pp.	 lxvii-lxxix,	quotation	p.	
lxix).	
Resisting Modernisation? Two African Responses to the Kariba Dam Scheme in the Central African Federation | 73
a “Minority Report”.90 Here, they discussed the Kariba Dam as a micro-study of the 
Federation’s discriminatory politics: All economic development currently taking place, 
they argued, was heavily biased towards the south, business and industry, that is, the 
white minority. Within the existing framework the “standard of life of the poor majority” 
would not improve; instead, development “helped most those who were already well-
off”.91 Habanyama, previously praised for his willingness to draw “a clear distinction 
between politics and local government”,92 now postulated an urgent need for political 
change since “there can be no long-term and stable economic prosperity …. until the 
Africans, duly elected by their people, are in control of their own governments.”93 How 
drastically the mediator’s course was shifting can furthermore be seen from the fact that 
Habanyama stood as candidate for Kaunda’s new United National Independence Party 
(UNIP) in 1962 – a party which was widely perceived as a more radical rival to Nkum-
bula’s Northern Rhodesian Congress.94
Moreover, little was left of Habanyama’s previous gradualism and cultural conservatism 
when he debated with officers over the uses of the future Lake Kariba in the later 1950s. 
While Southern Rhodesian authorities started to turn their part of the reservoir into a 
magnet for white tourism and big business, arguing that the indigenous people lacked 
the potential to develop the area by themselves,95 the Native Authority in the north 
insisted that the lakeshore, especially the fisheries, be managed by the Gwembe Tonga. 
If the people received exclusive fishing rights and sufficient funds, the Native Authority 
itself would “push on training and get boats and equipment at a rapid rate” so that “we 
can develop much faster”.96 Since the new land would not sustain the Gwembe Tonga on 
agriculture alone, the maxim was now “fish or starve”.97 At that stage, development had 
thus become a fierce competition over limited resources, in which the south threatened 
to outdo the north, blacks competed against whites, national interests jeopardised local 
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advancement ‘from within’ took a back seat, as all actors’ primary concern was not to be 
out-developed by their competitors. 
5. Conclusion
Late-colonial, state-making modernisation illustrates the complexity of colonial sub-
jectivation processes. As the examples of Hezekiah Habanyama and Harry Nkumbula 
show, development was not a “drama with two actors” – the powerful planners against 
the oppressed subalterns.98 Escaping clear-cut labelling like ‘resistance’ or ‘collaboration’, 
both cases demonstrate how colonial positions have to be located in the ‘in-between’, 
in reciprocal and dynamic negotiations, as is captured by the concepts of mimicry and 
hybridity.99 Habanyama’s role as one of “Government’s ‘good boys’”100 opened up “new 
possibilities of influence”, enabling him to have an impact on the resettlement.101 The 
middle man’s course, oscillating between privilege and responsibility, expediency and 
conviction, opposition and cooperation, complicates our understanding of colonial gov-
ernance and modernisation.102 It was the promise of development itself that prevented it 
from becoming a “simple knowledge-power regime” as those who worked from within 
the system appropriated, redirected and challenged the concept, drawing claims for ma-
terial prosperity and political participation from it.103 At the same time, this very ‘at-
tractiveness’ made it difficult to formulate alternatives. As the case of Harry Nkumbula 
demonstrates, industrialising hydroelectric schemes also worked for the “imagined com-
munities” of (soon-to-be) African nation-states.104 Therefore, state-making modernisa-
tion was a major locus of colonial ambivalence. Desiring a modern nation with indus-
tries and electric power as well as democracy, civil rights, the rule of law was, essentially, 
desiring the nation-state of the coloniser.105 
Modernisation’s ambivalence was the result of multiple and dynamic entanglements. 
Both Africans adopted strikingly similar positions in order to redress Kariba’s asym-
metries. At the same time, they belonged to competing political alliances, which – for 
different reasons – came under pressure in the course of time. Regarding their broader 
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courses and local experiences. The Congress president did not reject the technocratic 
rhetoric of Kariba’s planners, but, in the light of his own discrimination, could not be-
lieve that politics and economics were neatly separable. Moreover, through his network 
of supporters Nkumbula ensured that the local realities of ‘multiracial partnership’ boo-
meranged on the colonial centre. Habanyama was also a cultural broker106 who drew 
some of his concepts from the colonial service tradition, while also making his own sug-
gestions for the Tonga’s development. Witnessing colonial paternalism’s failures on the 
ground, however, he came to modify his position considerably to arrive at a politicised, 
fast-track vision not dissimilar to that of his opponents.
On the one hand, it is important to appreciate that modernisation was thus not a mon-
ey-knowledge-power monolith, but a complex negotiation among different actors.107 
On the other, notions of entanglement or ambivalence must not obscure Kariba’s overall 
lopsidedness. Neither Habanyama nor Nkumbula were able to prevent the Federation’s 
prestige project from becoming – and remaining – a prime case of asymmetrical, exclu-
sive development. Even today, more than 45 years after Zambia’s independence, many 
Gwembe Tonga do not have access to electricity and are food-aid dependent, having 
been driven from the lake by a multi-million fish industry and having lost even more 
land to those who could allegedly develop it better.108
06	 See:	A.	Eckert,	Cultural	Commuters	(footnote	02).	
07	 See	also:	M.	van	Beusekom,	Negotiating	Development:	African	Farmers	and	Colonial	Experts	at	the	Office	du	
Niger,	920–960,	Portsmouth	2002.
08	 That	is,	public	and	corporate	actors,	who	invested	in	tourism	and	other	commercial	activities	(T.	Scudder,	His-
tory	of	Development	(footnote	6);	J.	Leslie,	Deep	Water.	The	Epic	Struggle	over	Dams,	Displaced	People	and	the	
Environment,	New	York	2005,	pp.	9-200).
